Real Dollarization, Financial Dollarization, and Monetary Policy by Alain Ize & Eric Parrado

















REAL DOLLARIZATION, FINANCIAL 
DOLLARIZATION, AND MONETARY POLICY 
 











                                                 
 La serie de Documentos de Trabajo en versión PDF puede obtenerse gratis en la dirección electrónica:   
http://www.bcentral.cl/esp/estpub/estudios/dtbc. Existe la posibilidad de solicitar una copia impresa con 
un costo de $500 si es dentro de Chile y US$12 si es para fuera de Chile. Las solicitudes se pueden hacer por 
fax: (56-2) 6702231 o a través de correo electrónico: bcch@bcentral.cl. 
 
Working Papers in PDF format can be downloaded free of charge from: 
http://www.bcentral.cl/eng/stdpub/studies/workingpaper. Printed versions can be ordered individually 
for US$12 per copy (for orders inside Chile the charge is Ch$500.) Orders can be placed by fax: (56-2) 6702231 
or e-mail: bcch@bcentral.cl.  
BANCO CENTRAL DE CHILE 
 




La serie Documentos de Trabajo es una publicación del Banco Central de Chile que divulga 
los trabajos de investigación económica realizados por profesionales de esta institución o 
encargados por ella a terceros. El objetivo de la serie es aportar al debate temas relevantes y 
presentar nuevos enfoques en el análisis de los mismos. La difusión de los Documentos de 
Trabajo sólo intenta facilitar el intercambio de ideas y dar a conocer investigaciones, con 
carácter preliminar, para su discusión y comentarios. 
 
La publicación de los Documentos de Trabajo no está sujeta a la aprobación previa de los 
miembros del Consejo del Banco Central de Chile. Tanto el contenido de los Documentos de 
Trabajo como también los análisis y conclusiones que de ellos se deriven, son de exclusiva 
responsabilidad de su o sus autores y no reflejan necesariamente la opinión del Banco Central 




The Working Papers series of the Central Bank of Chile disseminates economic research 
conducted by Central Bank staff or third parties under the sponsorship of the Bank. The 
purpose of the series is to contribute to the discussion of relevant issues and develop new 
analytical or empirical approaches in their analyses. The only aim of the Working Papers is to 
disseminate preliminary research for its discussion and comments. 
 
Publication of Working Papers is not subject to previous approval by the members of the 
Board of the Central Bank. The views and conclusions presented in the papers are exclusively 
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Central Bank of Chile 





Documentos de Trabajo del Banco Central de Chile 
Working Papers of the Central Bank of Chile 
Agustinas 1180 
Teléfono: (56-2) 6702475; Fax: (56-2) 6702231 
 Documento de Trabajo  Working Paper 
N° 375  N° 375 
 
 
REAL DOLLARIZATION, FINANCIAL DOLLARIZATION, 
AND MONETARY POLICY 
 
Alain Ize  Eric Parrado 




Este trabajo estudia la interacción entre la dolarización real (salarios denominados en 
dólares), la dolarización financiera (contratos financieros denominados en dólares) y la 
política monetaria, en un modelo de equilibrio general con shocks reales. La dolarización real 
se evita si las autoridades monetarias actúan óptimamente (esto es, maximizan el bienestar 
interno). En caso contrario, la dolarización se expande si los bancos centrales se desvían del 
óptimo; y aun más si la correlación entre shocks internos y externos es alta ya que la política 
monetaria externa (presumiblemente óptima) garantiza un mayor nivel de protección contra 
la incertidumbre macroeconómica. Si bien la dolarización real contribuye a la dolarización 





This paper explores the interaction of real dollarization (dollar indexing of wages), financial 
dollarization (dollar denomination of financial contracts) and monetary policy in a general 
equilibrium model with real shocks. Real dollarization is avoided as long as the home 
monetary authorities perform optimally (i.e., they maximize local welfare). Instead, 
dollarization increases when central banks perform poorly, and even more so when the 
correlation between domestic and external shocks is high, since in this case the (presumably 
optimal) foreign monetary policy guarantees a better level of protection against 
macroeconomic uncertainty. While real dollarization contributes to financial dollarization, 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
Notwithstanding substantial progress during the last decade in controlling inflation 
throughout the world, financial dollarization (the dollarization of financial contracts) has 
expanded, rather than receded, in many developing and transition economies.
1 This raises the 
possibility that dollarization is a one-way street that will sooner or later lead to the demise of all 
but a handful of world currencies. Yet, the spread of dollarization appears to have been mostly 
concentrated in the financial sector. Real dollarization (the dollar denomination of price and 
wage contracts) appears to remain very limited. In particular, the vast majority of wage earners 
continues to have their wage denominated and paid in local currency, even in countries with 
high financial dollarization.
2  
Explaining this apparent asymmetry between financial and real dollarization requires a 
better understanding of what causes dollarization. In turn, this requires distinguishing between 
payments dollarization, financial dollarization, and real dollarization. Explanations for 
payments dollarization can be found in the early currency-substitution literature, based on 
inflation differentials that penalize the holdings of domestic currency.
3 Since financial contracts 
are immune to systematic inflationary taxation, explanations for financial dollarization must be 
based instead on risk and volatilities. Much progress has been achieved along these lines over 
the last few years, with financial dollarization being explained as a result of risk aversion and 
price risk (Ize and Levy-Yeyati, 2003), credit risk (Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee, 2004, and 
Jeanne, 2005), or moral hazard (Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo, 2001).
4  
                                                 
1 De Nicolo, Honohan and Ize (2005) find that deposit dollarization increased during the late 1990s in most 
countries that allow domestic dollar deposits, with declines seen in only a handful of Eastern European countries 
and emerging economies. 
 
2 Although there is limited statistical evidence on the extent of wage dollarization in highly dollarized countries, 
such as Peru, Bolivia and Uruguay, all observers agree that it is limited to a small fringe of top executives, mostly 
in large transnational corporations.  
3 Early discussions of ratchet effects and the impact of financial innovations on money demand can be found in 
Goldfeld (1976). Calvo and Végh (1996) present comprehensive surveys of the currency-substitution literature. 
 
4 Ize and Levy Yeyati (2006) present a comprehensive review of the recent literature on financial dollarization.   
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The literature on real dollarization lags behind that on payments or financial 
dollarization. In part, this is because there are few, if any, direct measurements of the extent of 
real dollarization. There have been attempts to measure real dollarization on the basis of the 
passthrough of the exchange rate on prices.
5 However, this is problematic on at least two  
counts. First, price dollarization may not necessarily reflect wage dollarization. Hence, it can 
only provide a partial view of real dollarization. More importantly, a passthrough measure does 
not distinguish between formal ex-ante indexation and ex-post adjustments caused by large 
swings in monetary policy. High passthroughs are likely to be detected when the data set is 
dominated by large nominal shocks where all prices (including the exchange rate) move in 
parallel. Yet, during such episodes of high inflation there may not be any underlying 
dollarization of contracts. Hence, measured passthroughs may decline pari passu with inflation, 
as found in many studies.
6 
Whether real dollarization matches financial dollarization has important policy 
implications. Once most prices and wages are set in foreign currency, there is little the local 
monetary authorities can do that will have any impact on macroeconomic variables. On the 
other hand, when prices and wages are set in local currency but most (if not all) financial 
intermediation takes place in dollars, the scope for currency mismatches, balance sheet effects, 
and, as a result, fear of floating, is exacerbated. 
This paper extends the analysis of Ize and Levy Yeyati (2003) to the real economy in the 
context of a fully endogenous monetary policy.  The main question the paper addresses is 
whether real dollarization responds to the same factors as financial dollarization. It does so by 
examining optimal wage indexation in the setting of a two-country “new open-economy” model 
in the tradition of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995 and 2000). The main conclusion is that agents' 
choice of the local or foreign currency for wage indexation depends, as financial dollarization, 
on price and exchange rate uncertainty. However, it also depends on the extent to which 
                                                 
5 De Nicolo, Honohan and Ize (2005) and Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) find a clear positive correlation 
between the passthrough of the exchange rate on the CPI and financial dollarization. But this is indeed exactly what 
one would expect if financial dollarization reflects the covariance of inflation and the exchange rate, as in the 
portfolio approach proposed by Ize and Levy Yeyati (2003). Thus, the passthrough may be a better proxy of 
financial dollarization than real dollarization. Even then, however, because it is purely backward looking (it does 
not reflect expectations), the passthrough is an imperfect measure of financial dollarization.   
6 See Goldfajn and Werlang (2000).   
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monetary policy is used to shield the economy from real disturbances and whether these 
disturbances are idiosyncratic (proper to each country) or systemic. Agents stick with the local 
currency (i.e., avoid wage dollarization) as long as the home monetary authorities conduct 
monetary policy close to optimally (in the sense of maximizing local welfare). Instead, large 
deviations from optimality promote dollarization, particularly when the correlation between 
domestic and external shocks is high, since in this case the (presumably optimal) foreign 
monetary policy guarantees a better level of protection. While financial dollarization is partially 
responsive to real dollarization (through its impact on prices and the exchange rate), high 
financial dollarization can coexist with low wage dollarization if: i) the economy is open; ii) 
shocks are mainly idiosyncratic; and iii) monetary policy emphasizes countercyclical 
management rather than strict inflation targeting. 
The main conclusions of our paper are clearly reminiscent of the basic result of the 
optimal currency area (OCA) literature.
7 Countries that are exposed to systemic (rather than 
idiosyncratic) shocks are better candidates to forego of their currency and join a common 
currency area. Whether the outcome of a market process or the choice of a centralized planner, 
the basic driving force behind the adoption of a foreign currency is the same in both cases. Our 
paper also connects with the large literature on endogenous passthroughs that started with 
Taylor's (2000) seminal contribution.
8 However, this literature focuses on price formation 
looking out (i.e., on export prices) rather than looking in (i.e., on domestic prices). By assuming 
that domestic prices may not necessarily be set in local currency, our paper provides a 
complementary, dollarization-oriented, perspective to this mostly trade-oriented literature.
9   
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the model. Section III solves the 
model in a general equilibrium setting. Section IV extends the analysis to the case of financial 
intermediation, allowing for a comparison of wage and financial dollarization. Section V 
                                                 
7 For a recent survey of the optimal currency area literature, see Alesina, Barro, and Tenreyro (2002). 
8 A number of recent papers, including Corsetti and Pesenti (2001, 2002, and 2005), Devereux, Engel, and 
Stoorgard (2004), and Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005) explore the linkages between the passthrough and 
monetary policy based on similar new Keynesian open economy models.  
9 This paper is also related to a recent contribution by Velasco and Chang (2006) that discusses the interaction 
between monetary policy and financial dollarization in a somewhat similar setting. However, Velasco and Chang 
only deal with financial (not real) dollarization.   
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broadens the discussion to include the possibility of a regime change. Section VI concludes by 
briefly reviewing some policy implications. 
II.   THE MODEL 
A.   Model Formulation 
We use a model of a small open economy which is quite similar to the ones developed 
by Corsetti and Pesenti (2001, 2005), Devereux and Engel (2002, 2003), and Parrado and 
Velasco (2002), among others. Thus, for the sake of brevity we only describe here the model in 
general terms and explain how it differs from the rest of the literature.
10 
The world comprises a small open economy (SOE) and the rest of the world (ROW). 
Domestic and foreign agents face symmetric consumption and labor supply choices, except that 
only home agents have the possibility to denominate (at least) part of their wage in foreign 
currency. In both cases, agents consume local and imported goods and sell their differentiated 
labor, under monopsonic conditions, to a representative firm producing the local good. The 
representative firm is perfectly competitive and uses a continuum of labor inputs. Consumers 
hold only money as an asset. We assume away at this stage the existence of domestic financial 
intermediation. 
In typical new-Keynesian fashion, agent i set his nominal wage in period t-1 and leaves 
it fixed for one period. Thus, he makes decisions in period t-1 based on his expected utility at 
time t, which depends on his consumption, 
i








                                                              [( )] ,
ii i i
tt t t t t UE c mpk L χ =+ − −                          (1) 
where the consumer price index is given by: 
                                                              , (1 ) , tH t t p ps γ γ = +−                                 (2) 
where , H t p is the price of the home good, γ is the share of home goods, and  t s  the nominal 
exchange rate. The production function exhibits decreasing returns with respect to aggregate 
labor: 
                                                 
10 The model’s starting equations are described in Appendix I and the main steps in resolving it in Appendices II 
and III. 
11 All variables are expressed in per-capita terms, with foreign variables denoted by an asterisk. We use capital 
letters for all natural magnitudes and lower case for logs.   
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 ,1 . tt yl θ θ = <  (3) 
The real wage in period t may deviate from its optimal level due to unexpected real 
disturbances (domestic or foreign). To reduce their exposure, agents can index part of their 
wage to the exchange rate, i.e., partly dollarize it. Let 
i
R µ  be the share of agent i's wage which is 
indexed. If the monetary authorities do not have a systematic inflationary bias, nominal 
variables should be expected to remain approximately constant. Thus, assuming    E[st]=st-1, the 
wage indexation rule may be expressed as: 
  i ([ ] ) ,
i ii
t tR t t ww sE s µ =+ −  (4) 
where  i w is the base (unindexed) wage. Given that the only asset is money, which is fully 
neutral, period-by-period equilibria are independent, and all real state variables are stationary 
and time-invariant. Thus, the expectation of any real (stochastic) variable, for any monetary 
regime, is also constant. 
The monetary authority of the home economy is assumed to follow a simple monetary 
rule that avoids surprises but reacts systematically to domestic and foreign productivity shocks: 
  *
** [] ( [ ] ) ( [] ) . tt k t t t t k mE m kE k kE k λλ =+ −+−  (5) 
A similar rule applies for the rest of the world, except that SOE is too small to affect ROW; 
hence, the foreign monetary authorities only react to home shocks. The parameters λ and λ
∗
 are 
set to maximize consumers’ expected welfare. 
 
 
B.   Model Resolution 
Resolving the supply side of the model leads to a conventional Phillips-type output 
equation with an added nominal exchange rate term (see Appendix II):  
  
,, , [ ( [ ] ) ( [ ])],
1








H y  is the flex-price equilibrium output. Hence, fix price output deviates from its flexible 
price level due to unexpected price movements, as well as, when wages are partly indexed 
(
i
R µ >0), unexpected exchange rate fluctuations.   
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On the demand side, the model can be reduced to a system of three equations such that 
output, the home price, and the exchange rate are a function of home and foreign monetary 
surprises (see Appendix III): 
   **
, (1 )( [ ]) ( [ ]), Ht R t t R t t H yy m E m m E m θµ θ µ −=− − + −  (7) 
 
**
,, [ ] [1 (1 )( [ ]) ( [ ]), Ht Ht R t t R t t pE p m E m m E m θµ θ µ −= − −− −− (8) 
 
** [ ] ( [ ]) ( [ ]). ttt t t t sE s mE m mE m −= − − −  (9) 
A positive domestic monetary impulse increases domestic demand, raising output and 
prices and leading to a nominal exchange rate depreciation. Inversely, a positive foreign 
monetary impulse leads to an exchange rate appreciation. In addition, in this model, the foreign 
shock reduces real wages when the latter are (at least partly) dollarized, thereby raising output 
and reducing prices. 
Rearranging the equations above, using (2), gives similar expressions for the domestic 
consumer price level and the real exchange rate, e = s - p: 
 
** [ ] [1 (1 )]( [ ]) (1 )( [ ]), tt R tt R t t pE p mE m mE m θγ µ γ γθµ −= − − − − − + −  (10) 
 
** [ ] (1 )]( [ ]) (1 )( [ ]). tt R t t R t t eE e mE m mE m θγ µ γ θµ −= − − − − −  (11) 
An increase in real dollarization  R µ  magnifies the impact of home monetary shocks on 
prices while limiting their impact on the real exchange rate. Thus, it raises the volatility of 
inflation but reduces that of the real exchange rate. This will establish a positive link between 
real and financial dollarization, since, as we shall see, financial dollarization increases with the 
ratio of inflation volatility to real exchange rate volatility. Note also from the price equation that 
the pass-through of the exchange rate on the CPI, which is given by the coefficient of the 
foreign money term 1 R γ γθµ −+ , has two components: an imported goods components, and a 
local goods component, with the latter being proportional to the degree of wage dollarization. 
We will refer back to these features later in the paper. 
In traditional neo-Keynesian fashion, uncertainty induces workers to mark up their real 
wage (and hence to work less) so as to limit their risk exposure. Thus, the fix-price expected 
















22 2 2 2
,, , 2
1
{ 2(1 ) (1 ) 2 [ (1 ) ]}.
2(1 )
HH H pp k k R s R p s k s V σθ σθ σ µ σ µ σθ σ
θ
=+ − + − + − + −
−
 (13) 
As a result, average fix-price consumption is lower than average flex-price consumption: 
  l /(1 ) , CC V
θ =+ (14) 
and maximizing expected welfare is equivalent to minimizing the risk premium. 
 
 
III.   REAL DOLLARIZATION 
A.   Optimal Monetary Policy 
The risk premium in ROW can be similarly expressed as a function of the shock and 
monetary policy: 






k V λ σ =+             (15)
 It follows that the optimal monetary policy for ROW (that minimizes V*) is a reactive policy 
such that λ
∗ = -1. By tightening (relaxing) monetary policy when agents' disutility of work is 
high (low), the foreign monetary authorities mimic an optimal flex-price wage policy, with 
labor adjusting through aggregate demand rather than the real wage. This reduces the 
macroeconomic uncertainty to which workers are exposed. 
With such an optimal monetary policy in ROW and assuming that the shocks in SOE 
and ROW have similar magnitude ( *
22
k k σ σ = ), a similar derivation for V can be obtained for 
SOE. Assuming for the time being that the home monetary authorities only react to the home 
shocks (this assumption is relaxed later), the optimal home monetary policy as a function of 
actual dollarization can be found by differentiating V with respect to  k λ , which gives:    










 .                                          (16) 
The resulting monetary policy schedule is shown in Figure 1. In the absence of wage 
dollarization ( 0 R µ = ), the home monetary authorities adopt the same counter-cyclical policy as 
the foreign monetary authorities ( 1 k λ = − ). Instead, with positive wage dollarization, monetary 
policy becomes less effective as real wages are less sensitive to money-induced price shocks. 
Thus, a higher “dosage” of monetary shocks (a more negative  k λ ) is needed to obtain the same   
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impact on real wages and output. At the same time, the adverse impact of monetary volatility on 
welfare is dampened by the fact that dollarization shields real wages from nominal shocks. 
Thus, monetary policy is both required and allowed to become more “aggressive” in 
counteracting domestic productivity shocks. 
 
B.   Optimal Wage Indexation 
Setting
i
R µ  to minimize V  leads to the following expression:  









=+ −                                       (17) 
where ij ρ  is the correlation coefficient between variables i and j.  
The first term on the right hand side of (17) is the minimum variance solution for 
employment (see Appendix V) and has the same form and rationale as a beta coefficient in the 
asset portfolio literature. Workers choose the level of real dollarization that stabilizes their 
employment the most, which amounts to minimizing the variance of the real wage in terms of 
home goods. Thus, workers prefer the dollar (they index their wage) if the volatility of the 
exchange rate is low relative to that of domestic prices, and the correlation between the 
exchange rate and home prices is high. As shown in Section IV, similar factors are at play when 
determining financial dollarization. 
Looking now at the second term on the right hand side of (17), workers also take into 
account the impact of unexpected changes in the demand and supply for labor, as reflected in 
the cross-correlations between the exchange rate and the real shocks. A positive correlation 
between the exchange rate and the real shock promotes indexation. If the exchange rate 
depreciates when k is high (i.e., when agents would prefer to work less), this raises the real 
wage when the latter is indexed. Thus, it reduces the demand for labor, thereby allowing 
workers to work less and enhancing their welfare. Instead, a reactive monetary policy, that 
tightens monetary conditions and appreciates the exchange rate when workers’ appetite for 
work declines, results in a higher unindexed real wage, enhancing the attractiveness of the local 
currency.   
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C.    General equilibrium 
With (8) and (9), the optimal dollarization can be expressed as a function of monetary 
policy: 













                                     (18)    
where ρ is the correlation between home and foreign shocks. The dollarization schedule has the 
shape shown in Figure 1. Notice in particular that wage dollarization vanishes for  1 k λ = −  and 
becomes negative in the interval  ] [ 1, k λ ρ ∈ −− . It follows that a monetary policy that is 
sufficiently (but not excessively) pro-active (i.e.,  [ 1, ] k λ ρ ∈ −− ) is consistent with no real 
dollarization. The level of protection a well managed local currency provides against shocks is 
sufficient to make it more attractive than the foreign currency, for any correlation of domestic 
and foreign shocks.  












Monetary policy reaction (lambda)
Dollarization (mu)
Monetary policy reaction (lambda)
 
Figure 1. Monetary Policy and Dollarization (ρ = 0.5) 
 
However, as ρ increases, the margin of error for maintaining a sub-optimal monetary 
policy without inducing dollarization shrinks. As 1 ρ → , 1 R µ → unless 1 k λ =− . Thus, small 
countries that are affected by the same shocks than their larger trading partners (for example the 
US) are more likely to dollarize.  
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Conversely, a passive monetary policy,  0 k λ = , promotes dollarization by the extent to 
which domestic and foreign real shocks are correlated,  . R µ ρ =  Thus, the combination of a 
passive monetary policy and an increasing correlation of shocks across countries, perhaps 
reflecting globalization, can result in growing dollarization. 
The dollarization and monetary policy curves cross in two places, however. There is also 
an inferior partially dollarized equilibrium with an over-active monetary policy 
(1 ; 1 / Rk µ ρλ ρ =− = − ). In the absence of dollarization inertia, the monetary authorities could 
presumably switch immediately from this inferior equilibrium to the non-dollarized equilibrium 
by adjusting monetary policy (setting  1 k λ = − ). However, with inertia, countries that are 
dollarized may get stuck in this inferior equilibrium.  
Finally, a very poorly managed monetary policy (a very high or a very low  k λ ) 
promotes dollarization even when local and foreign shocks exhibit little or no correlation. Thus, 
countries that clearly “lost it” (for example, that are unable to stabilize their currency) are likely 
to see dollarization increasing, even when they are large and do not trade much with the US.      
 
IV.   FINANCIAL DOLLARIZATION 
 
We now expand the model to cover the case in which both consumers and the 
representative firm enter into financial contracts which can be (partly or totally) indexed to the 
dollar. To keep matters simple, we assume that consumers are paid their salary in advance and, 
to finance such payments, make loans to the firm. These loans can be denominated in local 
currency or in dollars and must be repaid, with interest, the following period.  
A.   Safe haven equilibria 
We first examine the case in which firms are risk neutral. Let 
i
F µ  be the degree of 
financial dollarization chosen by consumer i, and  
*
t i and  t i  the nominal interest rates on foreign 
currency and home currency loans, respectively. The first order condition in
i
F µ  applied to 
consumers’ budget constraint leads to the following uncovered interest rate parity condition (see 







tt t s p s c s t iE ss i σσ σ − +− + − − =  (19)   
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When  , 0 cs σ > , exchange rate depreciations (which raise the return on dollar 
instruments) occur when consumption is high, making dollar instruments relatively unattractive, 
as reflected in a negative risk premium. Inversely, when  , 0 cs σ < , the dollar benefits from a 
“safe-haven” effect (returns are high at the time high returns are most needed, i.e., when 
consumption is low). 
Similarly, firms similarly choose F µ to maximize the expected value of their (real) 







tt t s p s t iE ss i σσ − + −+ −=  (20) 
Comparing (19) and (20), for both to be satisfied (i.e., to have an interior equilibrium), 
the equilibrium level of financial dollarization should be such as to eliminate the safe haven 
term, i.e.,  , 0 cs σ = . Should consumers’ interest income be the only component of their income 
that is affected by the exchange rate, this condition would be satisfied when, in the event of a 
depreciation, valuation gains on dollar loans were exactly offset by the inflationary losses on 
peso loans. As shown in Appendix IV, this implies a minimum variance level of financial 










==  (21) 
Substituting the consumer price index for the home price, this expression is identical to 
the first term in (17).
12 Thus, as for the minimum variance component of real dollarization, 
financial dollarization rises with the ratio of price volatility (in this case, consumer prices rather 
than producer prices) to exchange rate volatility and with the correlation between prices and the 
exchange rate. 
However, as consumers are both firm owners and lenders, valuation gains and losses on 
interest income are offset by opposite gains and losses originating from dividends. Indeed, 
consumers’ total income equals national income, which is affected by real dollarization (and 
monetary policy) but not by financial dollarization. This leads to single-currency, corner 
                                                 
12 This is the expression derived in Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003), expressed in terms of the real exchange rate, rather 
than the nominal exchange rate. 
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solutions that are entirely dominated by safe haven effects (rather than relative volatilities). 
When income (and consumption) increases as a result of a depreciation ( , 0 cs σ > ), the safe 
haven effects plays in favor of the local currency. When income (and consumption) falls 
( , 0 cs σ < ), the safe-haven effect plays in the other direction, inducing agents to intermediate in 
foreign currency exclusively. It is easy to check (see Appendix IV) that  , 0 cs σ < when: 










.                                        (22) 
Hence, when safe haven effects dominate, a passive monetary policy ( 0 k λ = ) induces real 
dollarization.   
 
B.  Minimum variance equilibria 
Consider now the (perhaps more realistic) case where firm managers are averse to risk 
and seek to smooth out profits over time. Thus, suppose firms maximize the log (rather than the 
level) of (real) profits, π. The first order condition for the firm’s optimal degree of financial 
indexation becomes: 






tt t s p s s t iE ss i π σσ σ − +− + − − =                                     (23) 
This expression includes now a covariance term between profits and the exchange rate, which is 
similar to the one between consumption and the exchange rate in equation (19). However, given 
that firms minimize interest payments (instead of maximizing interest returns, as in the case of 
consumers), its impact on currency choice is opposite to that of consumers. A negative 
covariance (the exchange rate is high when profits are low) induces firms to avoid dollar 
borrowing, limiting the scope for corner solutions.  
Instead, an interior solution is now obtained when: 
                                                              ,, s cs π σ σ = .                                  (24) 
It is easy to show (see Appendix IV) that profits are a multiplicative function of output 
(hence consumption) and interest payments: 
                              
*
11







Π= − + − + + ⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦
.           (25)   
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Hence, (24) requires that the covariance of interest payments and the exchange rate be equal to 
zero, yielding the minimum variance solution defined by (21). Safe haven effects vanish in this 
case because the negative correlation between consumption (or output) with the exchange rate, 
which makes the dollar attractive to a lender, makes it equally unattractive to a borrower. 
Hence, only relative volatilities matter.
13 
 
                                           C. Relative dollarization levels 
In either case, financial dollarization tends to exceed real dollarization. Take first the 
case of safe haven effects and risk neutral firms. As already noted, a passive monetary policy 
leads to full financial dollarization but to only partial real dollarization ( R µ ρ = ). On the other 
hand, an optimal monetary policy ( 1 k λ = − ) eliminates real dollarization ( 0 R µ = ). Yet, (22) 







). Thus, except if the 
economy is relatively closed (in which case  0 FR µ µ = = ), financial dollarization exceeds real 
dollarization.  
Take now the case of risk averse firms. The linkage between real and financial 
dollarization can be derived by replacing in (21) the variance and covariance of the exchange 
rate, as obtained from (9) and (10): 
                        
,





µγ γ θ µ γ θ λ
σ
=−+ + −                              (26) 
where  R µ stands for actual real dollarization (as distinct from its optimal level). This expression 
shows that financial assets can be divided up into those associated with imported goods, which 
should be fully dollarized, and those associated with local goods; in turn, the latter can be 
broken down according to the labor and non labor shares of output.  
The dollarization of the labor share should equal that of wages. Hence, real dollarization 
(a higher  R µ ) induces financial dollarization. In turn, the dollarization of the non labor share 
                                                 
13 More generally, should borrowers be risk averse but less so than lenders, the optimum lending mix would 
respond both to safe haven and volatility effects. If borrowers are risk averse, they care about volatility. Yet, if they 
are less risk averse than lenders, they can accommodate to some extent lenders’ preference for a safe haven 
investment (the effectively provide lenders some insurance against the risk associated with the safe haven effect). 
Hence, safe haven effects should also matter in determining the optimum lending mix.   
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depends on monetary policy (i.e., on how monetary policy affects relative price volatilities). 
Under an optimal monetary policy, this term is positive, as both  k λ  and  , s k σ  are negative. 
Hence, financial dollarization clearly exceeds wage dollarization, even when the latter is in 
excess of its optimal level (which is zero in this case). Under a passive monetary policy, this 
term disappears. Yet, financial dollarization still exceeds real dollarization, unless real 










). But if real dollarization is optimal, this could only occur in 












V.   REGIME CHANGES 
 
Expectations of possible monetary regime changes may affect current dollarization. To 
see this, suppose that the monetary authorities currently peg the exchange rate but would be 
ready to let it float if the size of the real shocks affecting the economy rises sufficiently. From 
(9) it can be readily inferred that a peg requires that the home monetary policy mimic that of 
ROW:  * 0; 1. k k λ λ == −  In the absence of the possibility of a regime change, both real and 
financial dollarization become indeterminate (this follows from (17) and (21) since 
,, , 0
H ps p s s k s σ σσ σ == == ). Indeed, it does not make any difference which currency to use 
when they are perfectly correlated. 
Suppose however that the real shocks are such that with a probability α  they are 
expected to maintain their current variance 
2
k σ  while with a probability1 α −  they are expected 
to increase in amplitude, to  '
22
k k σ σ  . Since all stochastic variables in the model are expressed 
as deviations from their expected means (i.e., they have zero means), the variances and 
covariances of the joint distribution are simply obtained as the weighted averages of the 
variances and covariances of each distribution, with weights  ,1 α α − . But since the variance of 
the nominal exchange rate and all the covariances with the nominal exchange rate are zero 
under the first regime, it follows that the variance and covariances of the joint distribution are 
equal to the variances and covariances under the new distribution of shocks and the new   
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monetary regime, times 1-α. It can then be immediately inferred from (17) and (21) that the 1-
α terms cancel out and current dollarization is only a function of expected monetary policy 
under the new regime, irrespective of the likelihood of a regime change. 
Suppose in particular that, should a switch from small to large shocks occur, the public 
expects the monetary authority to switch from a peg to an active float ( * 1; 0 k k λ λ =− = ). In this 
case, the monetary authorities would follow an essentially passive monetary policy under the 
peg. Yet, real dollarization would be zero because workers would not wish to be taken “flat 
footed” in the event of a large shock that motivates a regime change. The local currency 
effectively provides an “insurance” option against the possibility of large changes, no matter 
how remote.     
A similar argument could be made to justify the existence of very large financial 
dollarization under a peg. If the public expects that there is a positive probability that the 
monetary authorities may need to exit the peg at some point in order, say, to monetize an 
excessive public debt, the public would expect inflation and the nominal exchange rate to 
become highly (even if briefly) correlated in the event of a regime change. This would induce a 
current preference for the dollar as a way to protect the value of financial contracts under a bad 
state of the world.  
Indeed, the argument can be further generalized. When shocks and volatilities are 
limited under normal times, the use of a currency (local or foreign) may respond more to 
precautionary motives (i.e., to the expected monetary policy in the event of a large shock and a 
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VI.   CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has shown, based on a simple open-economy, general equilibrium model, 
that real and financial dollarization can be similarly explained by the stochastic properties of the 
economic environment and the policy response of the monetary authorities. Both types of 
dollarization should rise in response to an increase in the volatility of domestic inflation and fall 
in response to an increase in the volatility of the real exchange rate. The paper also showed that 
real dollarization contributes to financial dollarization.   
At the same time, the paper found at least three ways of explaining the apparent 
asymmetry between the substantial and rapidly expanding financial dollarization in many 
regions of the world and the so far contained real dollarization. First, while wage dollarization 
should remain limited if monetary policy is used actively to offset output and productivity 
shocks (i.e., if it used for “countercyclical” purposes), financial dollarization may remain 
substantial if such a policy triggers some inflation volatility.  
Second, financial dollarization, unlike wage dollarization, should reflect the trade 
structure of the economy. Thus, trade globalization could lead to rising levels of financial 
dollarization but not wage dollarization. This effect could be magnified, reflecting safe haven 
effects, if there is a strong asymmetry between borrowers and lenders as regards their tolerance 
to risk.  
Third, dollarization, both real and financial, can be determined by what could happen 
under a bad day rather than by what happens under normal days. Thus, while the local currency 
may be retained in real transactions as a protection against a large real shock requiring 
substantial relative price adjustments, the use of the dollar may become widespread in financial 
transactions as a protection against a large nominal shock (an inflationary bubble).  
The paper also found, however, that more highly correlated local and world real shocks 
(i.e., more syncronic business cycles, which one would expect to also accompany globalization) 
should also raise real dollarization unless the quality of local monetary management improves 
pari passu. Wage earners should be increasingly induced to switch to the currency of the 
country which does a better job at running its monetary policy. This last result is consistent with 
the thrust of the optimal currency area literature. 
A number of important policy implications looking forward can be derived. First, in the 
context of rising globalization, the competitive pressure on currencies should rise. Poorly   
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performing central banks might lose their market share not only of financial transactions but 
real transactions as well. When the latter happens, central banks might as well “fold their tent”. 
Monetary policy is a case of “use it well or lose it”.
14  
Second, there is a potential trade-off between policy objectives. Central banks that 
conduct strict inflation targeting limit financial dollarization, but may promote real dollarization 
(which could limit the effectiveness of monetary transmission). Inversely, central banks that are 
willing to accept some inflation volatility in order to attain a better countercyclical performance 
may limit real dollarization at the expense of broader financial dollarization (which, by 
accentuating currency mismatches, could induce some financial instability).   
Third, to avoid large currency mismatches driven by expectations of what could happen 
under a bad day, the monetary authorities would be well advised to adopt monetary regimes that 
are perceived to be fully sustainable. 
 
  
                                                 
14 Indeed, countries that have “given up” on their monetary policy are likely face an uphill struggle should they 
wish to resume an active monetary management after years of monetary passivity. At that stage, their real economy 
may have become so dollarized that their efforts to resume monetary operations may be totally ineffective or could 
trigger severe financial instability. See Ize and Levy Yeyati (2006).   
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                                                                                                                                 APPENDIX 
I. MODEL FORMULATION 
The full model comprises the following equations:  
 
  1 log log
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** (1 ) (1 ) nn γ γ − =−                                      (A3) 
    1 ()
ii i i i i
tt t t t t t PC M M W τ − +− = + Π +                          (A4)                                                 
      1 tt t M M τ − = −                                           (A5) 
        , tt H t t PC P Y =                                     (A6) 


















ε ε − − ⎡ ⎤ = ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ∫                                         (A9) 
                                                            tt YL
θ =                                                 (A10) 














                                       (A11) 
The parameter k,  which represents the disutility of work, is assumed to be lognormally 
distributed around its mean. (A2) is the aggregate real consumption index 
i
t C  for agent i. In 
accordance with the small country assumption, 
* γ  >> γ  and n* >> n, where n and n* are the 
measures of home and foreign workers. However, we assume that the demand for home goods 
by foreign agents is of similar size as the demand of foreign goods by domestic agents, from 
which (A3) follows. (A4) is agent i's budget constraint is, where 
i Π  is the dividend received 
from the firm and 
i τ  is a tax transfer from the monetary authorities that, in the aggregate, 
distributes all seigniorage back to households (Equation A5). Since agents, in the aggregate, do 
not accumulate assets, they consume all their income and the current account is always balanced 
(Equation A6). The representative firm maximizes profits, as given by (A-7), after it knows the   
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shocks that will affect it during the period; hence, it does not face uncertainty. (A8) and (A9) 
define the aggregate wage and employment, whereε >1 is the elasticity of substitution between 
labor inputs. (A10) is the production function and (A11) the wage indexing rule, as described in 
the text. 
                                                      II. AGGREGATE SUPPLY 
Maximizing (A7) subject to (A8), (A9), and (A10),  yields the labor demand function as 
a function of relative wages (the time subscript is dropped to simplify the notation): 












                                       (A12)  
and output as a function of the real product wage: 








− ⎡ ⎤ = ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
                                       (A13) 
Plugging the wage indexation rule (A11) into (A13) gives output as a function of unexpected 
exchange rate and price shocks: 
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Using (A4) and (A12), agent i's consumption and employment may be expressed, 
respectively, as: 
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                      (A16) 
Maximizing (A1) with respect to 
i W  subject to (A15) and (A16) leads to: 
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        Imposing symmetry, 
i
RR µ µ =  and 
i WW =  , this simplifies to: 
                                                                
1 1




=                                (A17)   
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In turn, inserting (A14) into (A17) and linearizing leads to equations (12) and (13) in the text, 
where the expected real wage under the flex-price solution equals: 










⎡ ⎤ = ⎢ ⎥ − ⎣ ⎦
  
Using (A10) and (A17), and assuming that the money-services component of utility is small and 
can therefore be neglected, (A1) can be written: 
                                         
1





=−                        (A18) 
Thus, maximizing expected welfare is equivalent to maximizing consumption, which, with (12), 
is equivalent to minimizing the risk premium V.  
 
III. AGGREGATE DEMAND 
Maximizing (A1) with respect to money balances leads to quantity-type home (and 
foreign) money demands: 




χ =                                                     (A19) 
            The domestic goods market equilibrium condition may be written: 
                                    
** * * (1 ) H nP Y n PC n SP C γγ =+ −                             (A20) 
or, with (A3) and (A6): 
                                                     
* CQ C =                                                  (A21) 
where 
* / QS PP =  is the real exchange rate. In turn, expressing (A19), and (A21) in logs, and 
assuming χ =
* χ : 
                                
** * mp c qc qm p χχ −=+=++=+ −                          (A22) 
It follows from this expression that: 
                                                        
* smm = −                                                 (A23) 
 
 
Using (A6), (A19), (A21) and (A22), we can express the producer price as a function of 
output and the money stock:  
                                                  () H p ym χ = −+−                                                (A24)   
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Finally, using (A14), (A23), and (A24), and solving for [ ] sE s −   and [ ] H H p Ep − gives output, 
the domestic producer price level and the exchange rate as a function of home and foreign 
monetary surprises, as shown in the text. 
 
IV. FINANCIAL DOLLARIZATION 





( ) (1 )(1 ) (1 ) ,
ii i i ii i i i i i i
FF
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PC M M W L P B i B i B
S
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−
+− = + Π + − + + − + +  (A25) 
where 
i B  is the loan he provides to the firm. The first order condition in 
i
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 (A26) 
which, taking logs and approximating for small values of the interest rates leads to (19) in the 
text.  
 The firm maximizes the expected value of its (real) profits: 
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 (A28) 
which, taking logs and approximating, leads to (20) in the text. 
  Using (A25) and since  / WL P C θ = : 
                             
* 11
11








−= Π − + + −+ + ⎢⎥
⎣⎦
                    (A29) 
Assuming that all wages are pre-paid,  11 // / B PB P W L P C θ −− = == , leading to (25) in the text. 
  Taking logs and using a linear approximation, the interest bill can be written: 
* (1 ) FFF ii s p µµµ −+ + ∆− ∆  and its variance:
22 2
, 2 Fs p Fs p µ σσ µ σ +− . Minimizing this last 
expression with respect to F µ immediately leads to (21). 
Using (A19) and (6), it follows that: 
                     
** [] ( 1 ) ( [ ] ) ( 1 ) ( [ ] ) RR cE c mE m m E m θγ µ γ θγµ −=− − + − + −                         (A30) 
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Taking the covariance with respect to s and using the monetary reaction functions leads to: 
                                               , [ ( ) (1 )(1 )], cs σ θγ λ ρ γ λρ = −+ + − +                                       (A31) 
from which (23) in the text follows. 
 
V. MINIMUM VARIANCE REAL DOLLARIZATION 
Employment is a function of the real wage, expressed in terms of the price of the home 
good: 
                               
1
11 1






− ⎡ ⎤ == ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
                                                 (A32)  
Thus, minimizing the variance of employment is equivalent to minimizing the variance of the 
real wage in terms of home goods. Using the indexing rule (A11), the variance of the 
probability distribution of the real wage can be expressed as: 
                      [ ]
22 2
, 2
H H H Rs p Rs p Var w p µσ σ µσ −= +−                    (A33) 
It immediately follows that the minimum variance real dollarization is: 
                                        
,
2






=                                         (A34)  
  23
REFERENCES 
Aghion, Philippe, Philippe Bacchetta, and A. Banerjee, 2004, “A Corporate Balance Sheet 
Approach to Currency Crises,” Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 119, No.1, pp.6-30. 
Alesina, Alberto, Robert Barro, and Silvana Tenreyro, 2002, “Optimal Currency Areas,” NBER 
Working Paper No. 9072 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic 
Research). 
Bacchetta, Philippe, and Eric van Wincoop, 2005, “A Theory of the Currency Denomination of 
International Trade,” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 67, Issue 2, pp. 295-319 
Burnside, Craig, Martin Eichenbaum, and Sergio Rebelo, 2001, “Hedging and Financial 
Fragility in Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes,” European Economic Review, Vol. 45, No. 
7, pp. 1151-1193.  
Calvo, Guillermo, and Carlos Végh, 1996, “From Currency Substitution to Dollarization and 
Beyond: Analytical and Policy Issues,” in Money, Exchange Rates, and Output, ed. by 
G. Calvo (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press), pp. 153–75. 
Corsetti, Giancarlo, and Paolo Pesenti, 2001, “Welfare and Macroeconomic Interdependence,” 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 116, No. 2, pp. 421–45. 
———, 2002, “Self-Validating Optimum Currency Areas,” NBER Working Paper No. 8783 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research). 
———, 2005, “International Dimensions of Optimal Monetary Policy,” Journal of Monetary 
Economics, Vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 281-305. 
De Nicolo, Gianni, Patrick Honohan, and Alain Ize, 2005, “Dollarization of Bank Deposits: 
Causes and Consequences,” Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 29, Issue 7, pp. 1697-
1727. 
Devereux, Michael, and Charles Engel, 2002, “Exchange Rate Pass-Through, Exchange Rate 
Volatility, and Exchange Rate Disconnect” Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 49, 
No. 5, pp. 913-940. 
———, 2003, “Monetary Policy in the Open Economy Revisited: Price Setting and Exchange 
Rate Flexibility” Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 70, No. 4, pp. 765-783. 
———, and Peter Stoorgaard, 2004, “Endogenous Exchange Rate Pass-Through when Nominal 
Prices are Set in Advance” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 63, No. 2,  pp. 263-
291. 
Goldfeld, Stephen, 1976, “The Case of the Missing Money,” Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity: 3, Brookings Institution, pp. 683–730. 
Goldfajn, Ilan, and Sergio Werlang, 2000, “The Pass-Through from Depreciation to Inflation: A 
Panel Study,” Working Paper No. 423, PUC-Rio (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto de Pesquias 
Econômicas e Aplicadas). 
Ize, Alain, and Eduardo Levy-Yeyati, 2003, “Financial Dollarization,” Journal of International 
Economics 59, pp 323-347. 
———, 2006, “Financial De-Dollarization: Is It for Real?” in Financial Dollarization: The 
Policy Agenda, ed. by Adrian Armas, Alain Ize, and Eduardo Levy Yeyati (Palgrave 
McMillan). 
———, and Eric Parrado, 2002, “Dollarization, Monetary Policy, and the Pass-Through,” IMF 
Working Paper 02/188. 
Jeanne, Olivier, 2005, “Why Do Emerging Economies Borrow in Foreign Currency?” in Other 
People’s Money, B. Eichengreen and R. Haussmann (eds.) (Chicago, Illinois: The 
University of Chicago Press)   
  24
Obstfeld, Maurice, and Kenneth Rogoff, 1995, “Exchange Rate Dynamics Redux” Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 103 (June), pp. 624–60. 
———, 2000, ”New Directions for Stochastic Open Economy Models,“ Journal of 
International Economics, Vol. 50 (February), pp. 117-53.  
Parrado, Eric, and Andrés Velasco, 2002, “Optimal Interest Rate Policy in a Small Open 
Economy,” NBER Working Paper No. 8721 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National 
Bureau of Economic Research). 
Reinhart, Carmen, Kenneth Rogoff, and Miguel Savastano, 2003, “Addicted to Dollars,” NBER 
Working Paper No. 10015 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic 
Research). 
Taylor, John, 2000, “Low inflation, Pass-through, and the Pricing Power of Firms” European 
Economic Review, Vol. 44 (June), pp. 1389-408. 
Velasco, Andrés, and Roberto Chang, 2006, “Currency Mismatches and Monetary Policy: A 
Tale of Two Equilibria,” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 69, No. 1, pp. 150-75  Documentos de Trabajo 
Banco Central de Chile 
Working Papers 
Central Bank of Chile 
  
NÚMEROS ANTERIORES  PAST ISSUES 
 
 
 La serie de Documentos de Trabajo en versión PDF puede obtenerse gratis en la dirección electrónica:   
www.bcentral.cl/esp/estpub/estudios/dtbc.  Existe la posibilidad de solicitar una copia impresa con un 
costo de $500 si es dentro de Chile y US$12 si es para fuera de Chile. Las solicitudes se pueden hacer por fax: 
(56-2) 6702231 o a través de correo electrónico: bcch@bcentral.cl. 
 
Working Papers in PDF format can be downloaded free of charge from: 
www.bcentral.cl/eng/stdpub/studies/workingpaper. Printed versions can be ordered individually for 





Trade Liberalization, Price Distortions, and Resource Reallocation
Roberto Álvarez y Matías Braun 
Agosto 2006 
 
   
DTBC-373 
Openness Can be Good for Growth: The Role of Policy 
Complementarities 
Roberto Chang, Linda Kaltani y Norman Loayza 
Agosto 2006 
 
   
DTBC-372 
Market Reforms and Efficiency Gains in Chile 
Raphael Bergoeing, Andrés Hernando y Andrea Repetto 
Agosto 2006 
 
   
DTBC-371 
Sovereign Debt in the Americas: New Data and Stylized Facts 




   
DTBC-370 
Identifying Fiscal Policy Shocks in Chile and Colombia 
Jorge E. Restrepo y Hernán Rincón 
Agosto 2006 
 
   
DTBC-369 
Bank Ownership and Lending Behavior 
Alejandro Micco y Ugo Panizza 
Julio 2006 
 
   
DTBC-368 
Inflation Targeting in Dollarized Economies 
Leonardo Leiderman, Rodolfo Maino y Eric Parrado 
Julio 2006 
 
   DTBC-367 
El Banco Central de Chile en Comparación con los Bancos 
Centrales del Mundo 
Marcelo Ochoa y Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel 
Junio 2006 
 
   
DTBC-366 




   
DTBC-365 




Metas de Inflación y el Objetivo de Pleno Empleo 
José de Gregorio 
 
DTBC-363 
Skill Premium in Chile: Studying the Skill Bias Technical Change 
Hypothesis in The South 
Francisco A. Gallego 
 
DTBC-362 
Setting the Operational Framework for Producing Inflation 
Forecasts 








Central Bank Independence and Monetary Policymaking 




The Consumption-Real Exchange Rate Anomaly: non-Traded 
Goods, Incomplete Markets and Distribution Services 






























   
DTBC-358 
Autonomía de Bancos Centrales: la Experiencia Chilena 
Luis Felipe Céspedes y Rodrigo Valdés 
Febrero 2006 
 